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Postmodernism & Paradise Lost: Reconsidering Knowledge, Politics and Literature 
 
I. Introduction: Postmodernism and Paradise Lost 
Creative work, specifically that of John Milton, may appear to find its origin in 
history, however, it has been my task to interpret Paradise Lost in an anti-historical mode. 
My study considers contemporary thought as the basis for a political interpretation of 
Paradise Lost. Linda Hutcheon describes the postmodern novel: "It begins by creating 
and centering a world...and then contesting it"(180). While her description stands as a 
trademark for the postmodern novel, it also stands as a description of John Milton's epic 
poem, Paradise Lost. This observation, however, demands clarification and justification. 
From what mountain do we stand in order to see Milton's epic as postmodern? And if we 
are to stand there, from this mountain, with a postmodern viewfinder, what will we see? 
How will the literary landscape change? In order to address these questions, this paper 
will take note of postmodern themes to find ideological points of intersection between 
historical and literary theory and Jean-Francois Lyotard's philosophy. Lyotard's method 
in, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984), is to analyze knowledge 
structures, for example economics, history, and science, in terms of legitimation and 
delegitimation. Analyzing these knowledge structures, specific to Western civilization, 
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poses philosophical problems with respect to the social bond, or social knowledge. 
Paying special attention to the political as one sphere of social knowledge I would like to 
show how the method for analyzing this body of knowledge is different than other 
empirical bodies. What is of particular interest to me is what a postmodern theory of 
knowledge is and how it contributes to a reading of Paradise Lost. From a postmodern 
point of view, how does Milton's text contribute to the study of knowledge? What does 
the knowledge we gain from reading this text according to a discourse initiated 300 years 
later, tell us about knowledge as a subject of history? Keeping Lyotard in mind 
throughout this paper, it will be my objective to answer these questions and stir up more 
questions about literature and its relationship to knowledge.      
Christopher Hill has argued that Milton's political views fall in line with 
politically radical groups. These groups, which include Grindletonians and Familists, 
share with Milton ideas about the relationship between a government and its people. I 
would like to draw a connection between these radical groups and Milton. Paradise Lost 
presents both political and religious views held among the radicals. By drawing a 
connection between certain radical views as found by Hill and their presentation in 
Paradise Lost, it is clear that a substantial part of Milton’s work is devoted to the 
presentation of radical ideas. Therefore, I will claim that Paradise Lost is primarily a 
political text, more specifically a radical text.  
With this designation, I look to J.C. Davis for a definition of radicalism. Davis 
attempts to redefine radicalism, not with regard to specific ideas, but rather to the mode 
in which radicalism operated in 17th-century England. Davis argues that radicalism is a 
theoretical entity. He continues to suggest that as a theoretical entity radicalism should be 
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evaluated differently. Consistent with radicalism’s metaphysical being, Davis argues that 
radicalism should be evaluated theoretically. In practice I have identified Paul de Man's 
literary theory of Romantic texts as sound and beneficial to an investigation of radicalism 
as a theoretical entity. De Man's conception of the poetic image and allegory as it relates 
to Romantic texts can be applied to Paradise Lost. It has been my task to explicate de 
Man's theory, using Milton as exemplary of his claims. In so doing I have discovered the 
importance of Milton's text to an understanding of radicalism as a theoretical entity. It 
will be the goal of this paper to show not only that Davis's definition of radicalism is 
justifiable, but also that it provides a unique reading of Paradise Lost. 
  Milton's text thinks about the relationship between literature and knowledge as 
productive. As a politically radical text Milton's poem had to be productive. As literature 
Paradise Lost produces in its readers knowledge of radicalism in 17th- century England. 
Milton's poem was not concerned with producing truth, nor did it aim to impart 
knowledge about right and wrong from a radically political standpoint. Paradise Lost is 
concerned with producing knowledge about a discourse that could not express itself 
according to explicit modes. Traditional society, that is the society understood to have 
existed in 17th-century England, employed a traditional system of government. The 
monarchy was not only traditional insofar as it depended on blood ties to decide who 
would rule but it had been England’s form of government for seven centuries. The 
English monarchy was the system to rule all systems, including language. Therefore 
radical ideas not only conflicted with a traditional system of government but they also 
conflicted with a system of language used by traditional governmental parties. 
Republicans and royalists debated heavily about the system of government that should 
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rule England; their views were expressed within a traditional system of language. The 
explicit demands of these two political groups could be found written in pamphlets and in 
speeches. Radically political groups in 17th-century England could not write down their 
views in pamphlets and share their ideas in public speeches. Radical ideas existed in a 
different form. Therefore, radicalism, in conflict with traditional modes of rule, and 
consequently with traditional modes of communication, found its expression elsewhere. 
Paradise Lost is a metadiscourse. The self-conscious assumption that this paper makes 
with respect to language is explicitly postmodern. Postmodernism does not provide a 
reading of Paradise Lost as representative of 17th-century politics at large, nor does it 
provide a reading of Paradise Lost as representative of one political viewpoint. 
Postmodernism provides a way of reading Paradise Lost as a political document itself.  
Part II. Interpreting Radicalism Through Literature: Symbolism, Satire and Angels 
In Milton and the English Revolution (1979), Christopher Hill argues that John 
Milton’s political and religious views fell in line with ideas that proliferated among a 
radical underground. English radicalism has hibernated as a culture. Unlike the 
republicans and the royalists, whose views were recorded, distributed, and historicized; 
radical ideas existed within discourse: “This third culture [radical underground] is 
difficult to identify, because its records are normally unwritten: our evidence comes from 
hostile accounts of church courts prosecuting heretics, of orthodox spokesmen 
denouncing them. What I say about it in this chapter is necessarily tentative” (Hill, 69). 
Although he argues that his remarks on the ideas of radicalism are derived from an 
empirical investigation, evidence of a different kind is found in Paradise Lost. This text 
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reveals that these ideas characterize radicalism— that radical ideas exist in a form of 
representation that goes beyond traditional structures. 
Hill outlines four radical ideas that surfaced in the 1640s; first, anticlericalism, 
second, the denunciation of sacred imagery, third, anti-Trinitarianism and fourth, 
mortalism. These ideas were heretical to the political and religious state of England in the 
mid-seventeenth-century. These ideas form a concept of radicalism as not merely 
oppositional to but fundamentally distinct from the current political and religious 
situation. While reanimating the characters from the book of Genesis, Paradise Lost also 
brings to the forefront these radical ideas. 
The first radical view that Hill outlines is anticlericalism, the idea that members of 
the clergy held no sovereignty over the common man. Anticlericalism, was an avenue 
toward tolerance and equality, 
Anticlericalism was the view that a layman is as good as a parson. It may extend 
to seeing the whole ecclesiastical hierarchy as antichristian, to rejection of tithes 
and a state church, to hostility towards universities as training centres for the 
clergy, to advocacy of ‘mechanic preachers’ who enjoy the spirit of God, so much 
more important than academic education (71). 
The radical view of anticlericalism opposed an academic-based production of preachers, 
because they did not see Christianity as a literal and objective system. Specifically, the 
Familists and the Grindletonians found the practice of Christianity to be closer to a 
philosophy, or a way of thinking, than to an instructional code: “Familists were said to 
believe that Christ and Antichrist were not real people, heaven and hell not real places: all 
were states of mind. The Grindletonians, like Thomas Munzer before them and Gerrard 
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Winstanley after them, emphasized the spirit as against the letter of the Bible, a doctrine 
not unknown to Milton” (75).  
Book IV of Milton’s poem serves as evidence of his familiarity with the radical 
idea of anticlericalism. In Book IV, Milton presents a dual context—a narrative that 
references two metanarratives, the polytheistic, of gods and the monotheistic, of God. 
The polytheistic and the monotheistic are referred to here as metanarratives because they 
are consistent with their respective historical narratives. The concept of the metanarrative 
is one that Lyotard employs to describe myths or narratives that are read for the purpose 
of instruction, that is as a vehicle for knowledge. The radical intolerance for the “letter of 
the Bible” or the word as truth, is consistent with a postmodern intolerance for the 
metanarrative. The bond between the radical intolerance for the Bible as objective truth 
and postmodernism’s intolerance for the metanarrative is summed up when Lyotard 
states: “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward 
metanarratives” (Lyotard, xxiv). Milton’s positioning of two metanarratives in his epic is 
testament to the radical idea of anticlericalism, because it does not allow one 
metanarrative to take precedence over the other. In fact Milton sees these two 
metanarratives as necessary to one another, as necessary to the creation of a state of mind 
rather than an objective mode of being. 
Milton alludes to a polytheistic metanarrative when he articulates a description of 
the Tree of Life. What constitutes a polytheistic metanarrative is a text that references the 
polytheistic narrative— the narrative of the gods and of immortality. The text describes 
the Tree of Life with three descriptors. These three descriptors provide a reference 
consistent within a polytheistic metanarrative, that is, a classical literary tradition. Amidst 
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a description of the landscape that constitutes the garden of Eden, the Tree of Life is 
described:  
Out of the fertile ground He caus’d the grow 
All trees of noblest kind for sight, smell, taste 
And all amid them stood the Tree of Life 
High eminent blooming ambrosial fruit 
Of vegetable gold. (IV: 216-220) 
This passage articulates three significant descriptors: “High,” “eminent,” and “blooming 
ambrosial fruit” allude to a polytheistic metanarrative. “High” characterizes the tree’s 
stature, directing our gaze above earth, into the heavens, into the realm of the gods. 
“Eminent” characterizes the Tree of Life, as the grandest of its kind, god-like. The Tree 
of Life is, moreover, “blooming ambrosial fruit”; this final descriptor points readily to the 
nature of the Tree of Life as vital, providing food for the immortal— fruit for the gods. 
That the Tree of Life bears immortal fruit fit for the gods, so too the Tree of Life is itself 
immortal. This description of the Tree of Life explicitly references the polytheistic 
metanarrative to describe the tree as immortal, characterizing the tree’s` metaphysical 
being. Thus, the mythology of immortality establishes itself as a figure present in the 
garden of Eden. 
Just as the Tree of Life provides fruit for the gods, the text ambiguously suggests 
the Tree of Life to be the parent of the Tree of Knowledge in a passage spoken by Adam: 
He who requires 
From us no other service than to keep 
This one, this easy charge, of all the trees 
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In Paradise that bear delicious fruit 
So various, not to taste that only Tree 
Of Knowledge planted by the Tree of Life. (IV: 419-424) 
I dare to interpret “planted by” in the last line of this passage as an act performed by the 
Tree of Life in order to suggest the immortality of both of these trees. Given this 
relationship, how then does the Tree of Knowledge cross over from the polytheistic to a 
monotheistic metanarrative, from a structure that considers immortality to a structure 
founded on the grounds of man’s mortality? 
Previously, I posited that the immortality of the fruit grown by the Tree of Life is 
an indication of the immortality of the tree itself; logically speaking then if I am to 
suggest, as I just have, that the Tree of Knowledge was planted by the Tree of Life, then 
it is also immortal. Can we also assume that the fruit of this immortal tree, the Tree of 
Knowledge is ambrosial, is “Of vegetable gold?” With respect to the Tree of Knowledge 
Milton tells us by the end of the epic that it is Adam and Eve who eat from this tree. It is 
the effect of the Tree of Knowledge that causes Adam and Eve to become mortal. The 
text, subsequent to the description of the Tree of Life, describes the Tree of Knowledge 
in terms of its effect on Adam and Eve: “And next to Life / Our death, the Tree of 
Knowledge, grew fast by; / Knowledge of good bought dear by knowing ill”(IV: 220-
222). The Tree of Knowledge is characterized as “Our death,” as mortality directed by 
God who commands that Adam and Eve should not eat from the tree. Similarly Adam 
says of the Tree of Knowledge, “So near grows death to life, whate’er death is, / Some 
dreadful thing no doubt, for well thou know’st / God hath pronounced it death to taste 
that Tree”(IV:425-427). God’s command over Adam and Eve references a monotheistic 
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metanarrative. However the fruit provided for the gods is of the same nature as that 
provided for Adam and Eve by the Tree of Knowledge. The fruit is variable; that is, it 
legitimates, or nourishes an immortal and a mortal figure. “Vegetable gold” serves as a 
symbol for knowledge insofar as one more educated Christian can be no more Christian 
than the uneducated Christian. That this food be provided to both the gods and our first 
parents illustrates tolerance for a variable practice and view of Christianity, the ultimate 
goal of anticlericalism. 
As a symbol, vegetable gold stands for a radical idea of anticlericalism, serving 
the idea that gods, or the clergy, are no more privileged in their belief of God than the 
common man, Adam and Eve. The symbol serves to level the sovereignty between priests 
and laymen, to advocate belief in God as a state of mind, not a set of commands. 
Another radical idea that Hill outlines is the denunciation of sacred imagery; 
radicals saw the imagery and glorification of the church as extreme blasphemy. 
Radicalism promoted the worship of God anywhere, anyhow. As Hill articulates, the 
denunciation of sacred imagery was replaced by worship of personal design: 
Secondly comes strong emphasis on study of the Bible, and use of its texts— as 
interpreted by the individual conscience— to criticize the ceremonies and 
sacraments of the church. Worship of images, for instance, was denounced as 
idolatry. Sacredness was denied to church buildings: worship and prayer could 
take place anywhere (71). 
This viewpoint is one that has previously pinned Milton as an iconoclast due to his 
insistence on intellectual and religious freedom that could be expressed by shattering 
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those images and idols that served as a reminder of God’s command over man (Hill, 
262). 
In Book I, the explicit denunciation of biblical idols is presented when Milton 
calls upon his muse to figure images of the fallen angels: “Say, Muse, their names then 
known, who first, who last” (I: 376). Following this summoning, his muse proceeds to 
name the fallen angels: “First Moloch, horrid king, besmeared with blood” (I: 392), 
“Next Chemos, th’ obscene dread of Moab’s sons” (I: 406), “Him followed Rimmon 
whose delightful seat/ Was fair Damascus on the fertile banks/ Of Abbana and Pharphar, 
lucid streams./ He also ‘gainst the house of God was bold” (I: 467) and the most 
demonishly figured, 
Came Astoreth whom the Phoenicians called 
Astarte, Queen of Heav’n, with crescent horns, 
To whose bright image nightly by the moon 
Sidonian virgins paid their vows and songs, 
In Sion also not unsung where stood 
Her temple on th’ offensive mountain, built 
By that uxorious king whose heart, though large, 
Begiled by fair idolatresses, fell 
To idols foul. (I: 438-446) 
This last description of Astoreth, makes Milton’s critical position, with respect to the 
Catholic church’s practice of idolatry, explicit. Astoreth is the idol for whom all 
Catholics are rendered ultimately submissive to God’s command. They are “uxorious 
king[s]” and supremely ignorant of deception “begiled by fair idolatresses.” As a satire, 
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Milton’s figuring of the fallen angels after heretical characters, ridicules the hypocrisy of 
religious practices, specifically Catholicism that glorifies Christian imagery. 
Hill’s third outline of a radical idea is that of anti-Trinitarianism. The denial of 
Christ’s divinity and the Holy Ghost was a heretical view that had proved dangerous in 
the previous century, and no doubt remained underground for that reason. The rapid 
spread of anit-Trinitarianism both in the liberal reign of Edward VI and in prisons under 
Mary gave rise to great alarm among the orthodox. In 1555 the divinity of Christ was the 
subject of discussions in an underground meeting in a Colchester tavern. Between 1548 
and 1612 at least eight persons were burnt in England for heresies concerning the Trinity, 
including Marlowe’s friend Francis Kett, grandson of the leader of the Norfold rebels of 
1549 (73). 
A rebel claim and a resurfacing radical claim, anti-Trinitariansim appears 
consistent with the first view Hill brings up about the equality of the laymen with the 
clergy. If the radicals contended that knowledge of God lay in an individual mode of 
belief rather than a knowledge or truth oriented curriculum, it is consistent that they 
would reject the sovereignty of Christ’s presence on earth, and favor his humanity. Hill 
defines anti-Trinitarianism as: “Another recurrent doctrine is anti-Trinitarianism, 
heretical emphasis on the humanity of Christ”(72).  
Milton addresses this view, highlighting the humanness of Jesus in Book III. 
In Book III God tells of Satan’s entrance into the garden and his aim to deceive Adam 
and Eve, to bring them to the fall: 
And now 
Through all restraint broke loose he wings his way 
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Not far off Heav’n in the precincts of light 
Directly towards the new created world 
And Man there placed, with purpose to assay 
If him by force he can destroy or worse 
By some false guile pervert. And shall pervert, 
For Man will hearken to his glozing lies 
And easily transgress the sole command, 
Sole pledge of his obedience. So will fall 
He and his faithless progeny. (III: 86-96) 
God’s foresight is limitless. God sees Satan enter into Eden, and he foretells the fall of 
Adam and Eve. However, his command is bound by Adam and Eve’s free will: “I made 
him just and right, / Sufficient to have stood though free to fall” (III: 98-99). God 
continues, helpless to the force and power of their freewill: “They themselves decreed / 
Their own revolt, not I. If I foreknew / Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault / 
Which had no less proved certain unforeknown”(III: 116-119). As God’s son listens to 
his father’s foretelling of the fall of man, Christ’s humanity is described: 
Thus while God spake ambrosial fragrance filled 
All Heav’n and in the blessed spirits elect 
Sense of new joy ineffable diffused. 
Beyond compare the Son of God was seen 
Most glorious. In Him all His Father shone 
Substantially expressed and in His face 
Divine compassion visibly appeared: 
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Love without end and without measure grace, (III: 135-142). 
These lines illustrate Christ’s human qualities. His face is showing “divine compassion.” 
Christ’s compassion is “divine” not because he is the Son of God, but because the 
magnitude of his compassion is comparable to the might of God. Christ inquires as to the 
prospect of Adam and Eve ever finding grace. In response God proposes to deliver grace 
to Adam and Eve in exchange for one of his heavenly being's immortality: “Say, 
Heavn’ly Pow’rs, where shall we find such love? / Which of ye will be mortal to redeem / 
Man’s mortal crime and, just, th’ unjust to save? / Dwells in all Heaven charity so dear?” 
(III; 213-216). God proposes immortal life in heaven in exchange for mortal life on earth 
to save man; “He asked, but all the Heavn’ly choir stood mute/ And silence was in 
Heav’n”(III; 217-218). The silence of the angels in response to God’s proposition 
amplifies the importance of compassion as a uniquely human quality. Christ’s humanity 
allows him to show compassion for our first parents.  
The Bible tells us, “For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten 
Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life” (John 
3; 16). In the Bible God chose his Son to save our first parents. God gave his Son, 
commanded his Son to be sent to earth to save man. Milton’s text does not give God this 
power, as God is powerless in the face of free will with respect to Adam and Eve. He is 
also powerless to choose a heavenly being, to take away an angel’s immortal presence in 
heaven for the sake of man. However, it is Christ who volunteers, Christ whose humanity 
calls him to ask God to send him to save man: 
Behold Me then, Me for him, life for life 
I offer. On Me let thine anger fall. 
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Account Me Man. I for his sake will leave 
Thy bosom and this glory next to Thee 
Freely put off and for him lastly die 
Well pleased. On Me let Death wreck all his rage! (III:236-241) 
Milton’s portrayal of Christ’s humanity, through his compassion and his volunteer effort 
to save man, illustrates the concept of anti-Trinitarianism that was a radical idea in the 
1640s. Up to now, it is apparent that Milton’s political and religious views were 
legitimately radical. Paradise Lost articulates the radical ideas of anticlericalism, 
iconoclasim, and anti-Trinitariansim by presenting two metanarratives, figuring the fallen 
angels and illustrating Christ’s humanity. 
Finally, Hill presents the doctrine of mortalism. Hill claims with respect to this 
doctrine, “If at death the body returns into its elements, as a drop of water taken out of the 
ocean returns to it again, mortalism can also lead to skepticism about the physical 
existence of heaven and hell” (75). It is important here to remember that Hill does not 
categorize Milton into any specific group of radicals; the groups varied from one extreme 
of radicalism to another. The spectrum reaches from a view that maintained a political 
charge only by objecting to the current political state of England, while other groups went 
so far as to oppose the political and religious doctrines that governed England. I maintain 
that it is Milton’s objective to present these views not as his own, but as existent in the 
time and place he was writing. Therefore, with respect to this doctrine, I resist reaching 
into Milton’s poem for evidence to support Hill's claim with respect to mortalism. While 
it may be argued that Milton’s poem can be theorized to support this view of radicalism, I 
do not think that the denial of the physical existence of heaven and hell was at the 
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forefront of Milton’s goals for Paradise Lost. This view deals in a realm that does not 
seem relevant to the imaginative aspect of Milton’s work. Hill points out, “Mortalism 
could be accompanied by, or lead to, a species of materialism”(Hill, 74). I believe it is 
Milton’s priority to explore imaginatively the radical viewpoints that hovered in the air of 
mid-seventeenth-century England, and an analysis of a viewpoint that leads to a form of 
materialism feels to me to be irrelevant. 
III. Radicalism: Bringing Politics into Existence 
It has been shown that Paradise Lost is illustrative of 17th-century radical ideas. Is 
it enough to define radicalism in terms of the ideas that fall under the category of 
'radical'? This definition of radicalism is not sound. Radicalism itself remains a subject of 
inquiry.  After all, if radicalism is to be defined in terms of the ideas associated with it, 
there still remains a force of radicalism itself, a force that brings these views into 
existence. In his paper, J.C. Davis redefines 17th-century English radicalism in different 
terms. It is Davis's prerogative to provide a view of radicalism that may allow a more 
thoughtful evaluation of its status in history and in politics. Davis shows that radicalism 
is a theoretical entity that is contingent on its own specific historical moment and mode 
of expression. The attention to specific moments in history and modes of expression is 
how radicalism distinguishes itself from itself throughout history. Davis calls for a 
reading of culture as a means of giving 17th-century English radicalism a voice of its own 
rather than a voice that echoes a non-theoretical analysis of English political history: 
"The paradox, in this instance, is that radicals who rejects the status quo constituent of 
reality are brought to book in terms of it" (Davis) 
Smith 16 
J.C. Davis resists an established view of radicalism that judges the status of the 
theoretical according to the criteria of the literal, or the real. This view situates radicalism 
as a static moment in a historical narrative. As part of a historical narrative radicalism is 
susceptible to being categorized in ways that provide limited, if any, epistemological 
value. He suggests a postmodern analysis of radicalism insofar as it identifies the 
historical narrative as over-determined, reductive and incommensurable. We 
acknowledge the implications of encapsulating radicalism inside the historical narrative 
by understanding Lyotard's assertions about the character of the metanarrative. A 
definition then, of radicalism, involves refining a perspective of the theoretical, setting 
aside rationalism for the prospect of possibility. 
If radicalism continues to be associated within a historical narrative, it is 
subjected to a reductive authority, repressing its theoretically-unique quality. More 
importantly, historians will continue to conclude that mid-seventeenth-century English 
radicalism failed. What are the implications of convicting the theoretical of failure? What 
knowledge do we gain by categorizing radicalism in mid-seventeenth-century England as 
a failed event in the history of English politics and society? The implications are many 
and the knowledge is meager. Therefore a historical narrative is an insufficient ground for 
an analysis of radicalism. In fact, Lyotard would agree that placing radicalism inside the 
narrative perspective is both irresponsible and slighting of a particular social bond. 
Radicalism as a theory is a particular social bond, and the demands put on it by the 
historical narrative puts its legitimacy, not its success or failure, into question. Lytoard 
poses the question: "Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside?" (Lyotard, 
xxv). It is my contention that we learn nothing about radicalism by looking at its 
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associations with historical events. Instead we attach names and documents to this failed 
event, thus categorizing those as failed figures. Looking at radicalism in this way 
articulates the status of radicalism, not radicalism itself. To discover where legitimacy 
resides Davis aims to deconstruct all of the theoretical elements of radicalism and 
evaluate them in terms of legitimacy. The theory of radicalism in mid-seventeenth- 
century England is specific to the traditional society that it aimed to uproot. Davis points 
out key figures of seventeenth-century radicalism that are slighted by their associations 
with the events of the age. Furthermore, their assumed participation in a historical 
narrative serves only for a reading of their status that is their success or failure. The 
historical narrative does not allow for an investigation of the theory itself. Davis provides 
specific examples of seventeenth-century figures that have been defaced by a reading of 
radicalism in terms of success and failure: 
We can— and do— enhance the status of these ‘thinkers ahead of their time’ in 
two ways. In the one they become ‘philosophers of a revolution that failed and 
Samuel Hartlib, William Sprigge, Gerrard Winstanley and James Harrington, 
amongst others, have all been auditioned for that role. Secondly, we can hook 
them on to some long-term ‘success’ story. We depict them as visionaries, 
dreamers, utopians and talk about their undefined- often unexamined- 
contribution to a radical, liberal, socialist, (if your lucky) feminist tradition. 
(Davis 194) 
In order to avoid a reading of radicalism as an event in an arbitrary historical narrative, 
Davis suggests reading radicalism as theoretical. By doing so Davis applies a “process” 
that analyzes radicalism with respect to its ideological, theoretical, and imaginative 
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elements. The “process” inherent in a theoretical reading of radicalism according to 
Davis entails delegitimation, legitimation, and the involvement of a transfer mechanism. 
This "process" is the means by which the theoretical comes into existence. 
Delegitimation, legitimation and the involvement of a transfer mechanism are the primary 
functions of radicalism, and an evaluation of radicalism requires an assessment of these 
functions and their ability to resolve the problems posed to radicals. 
To begin with, Davis loosely defines radicalism in contrast to reform. Where 
reform aims to augment an existing situation, radicalism aims to completely destroy the 
existing situation (203). With that in mind I would like to highlight what Davis identifies 
as the primary functions of radicalism, and to show how the problems they pose grant 
seventeenth-century-English radicalism epistemological value. 
The first function is delegitimation, which requires that an existing system is 
wrong and necessitates replacement. Davis argues that delegitimation aims to uproot 
existing systems, he states:  “Radicalism in its insistence upon root and branch change 
must show the whole to be unsoundly based upon false principles” (204). Radicalism 
views change from the ground up. It requires that a system built on unsturdy ground be 
re-tilled, that the soil be reinvigorated, the earth revitalized so that a new system can be 
implemented. The second function is the legitimation of a new system to replace the 
destroyed system. Delegitimation and legitimation are consequences of one another; they 
are mutually dependent. Legitimation requires an idea, a vision for something other than 
what exists. Legitimation requires the innovative strength of imagination. The third 
function of radicalism is the employment of a transfer mechanism. The transfer 
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mechanism serves as the evidence that an old system has been destroyed and a new one 
has been implemented. 
The major problem posed by Davis's process, delegitimation, legitimation and the 
involvement of a transfer mechanism, is that it essentially requires an agent for 
destroying and for creating. That is, the transfer mechanism must both legitimate, or 
create a representation, and delegitimate, or destroy the authority of an existing 
representation. This way of evaluating radicalism poses questions about authority and 
who or what should hold it. By suggesting reading radicalism according to its primary 
functions we gain knowledge specific to mid-seventeenth-century radicals, and instead of 
attaching figures to radicalism we are poised to ask questions about forms of rule, ways 
of governing, and the inherent problems that arise when we speak of processes that 
concern destruction and creation. Can one system really be destroyed? If it is, can the 
imagination’s view of what should replace it ever become a reality? What is the transfer 
mechanism that transposes vision into reality? 
Evaluating the performance of radicalism’s three primary functions similarly 
allows us to digest the material of the mid-seventeenth-century differently and perhaps 
place documents and figures that had not before been looked at in the role of performers 
of these functions. The claim that radicalism is crucially theoretical and that the radical 
“process” should be evaluated leads Davis to his final remarks about the radicals in mid-
seventeenth-century England. 
Charles I, the emblem of centuries of monarchial rule, was a political and 
religious target for the radicals. His severe rule was a testament to the traditional society 
that dominated the English. Davis concludes that the traditional situation presented a 
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distinct task for radicals, that a society based on an intolerance for change renders the 
radical theory of mid-seventeenth-century England unique, he concludes: “Thus 
radicalism of mid-seventeenth-century England appears unique in its own period. We 
should evaluate it in terms consistent with that uniqueness” (213). A reading of 
radicalism in this period, according to its primary functions, may allow us to gain insight 
from sources previously overlooked or categorized in opposition to the established view 
of radicalism as a historical event. 
IV: Discovering a Theoretical Entity: Paul de Man’s and the Critique of Language,   
   the Poetic Image and the Value of Allegory 
With Davis in mind, I will investigate a theoretical reading of Romantic texts by 
Paul de Man. I will attempt to further these readings by finding support for de Man's 
claims in Paradise Lost. Using de Man's theory of the poetic image and his conception of 
allegory, I will show that Paradise Lost not only presents radical ideas but also uproots 
traditional texts, most notably the Bible. I would like to argue that the poetic image and 
allegory are literary devices capable of the process that Davis requires of an analysis of a 
theoretical entity, specifically radicalism. 
In his essay, The Structure of Romantic Nature Imagery (1970), William K. 
Wimsatt Jr. identifies the Romantic landscape as a literal, material landscape. Our ideas 
of the natural world enter us through our senses. The poet expresses these ideas of the 
natural world through language. Wimsatt argues that Romantic poetry is essential in its 
capacity to present an experience of nature through language in such a way that is not 
dissimilar from an experience of nature outside of language. “[We may see] romantic 
poetry as a step toward the directness of sensory presentation” (88). In Wimsatt’s view 
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the “imitative powers of language” (87) enable the poet to recreate nature. Language is 
rendered a mimetic force. As such, Wimsatt continues to premise his argument on the 
claim that the imagination is a faculty capable of merging or “fusing” the material or the 
sensory and thought. This merger, according to Wimsatt, recreates a landscape, similar to 
a photograph. 
A photograph in its 5x7 frame serves Wimsatt’s idea of the merger between 
thought and sensory perception. Photography captures an image that serves as a testament 
to an experience. The figure in the image is not the figure of experience. The image is a 
representation of the figure of experience. However, since the difference lies merely in 
the form of representation, it can be said that a fountain in a photograph is still the 
fountain in the park where the picture was taken— it still is. For Wimsatt the gap 
between the figure and its representation can be bridged. The presentation of the 
photograph can serve the viewer as actually having had an experience of sitting in the 
park, looking at the fountain. Similarly, the poetic image in its shift from experience to 
language, is fixed— that is, the poetic images crosses over from nature to language 
unaltered. This inconspicuous shift, as Wimsatt sees it, is conceivable because of 
language’s system of signs: “But romantic nature poetry tends to achieve iconicity by a 
more direct sensory imitation of something headlong and impassioned, less ordered, 
nearer perhaps to the subrational” (87). Wimsatt’s argument finds nature unordered, 
perhaps reckless, in need of universal presentation; which he contends can be found in 
language.  Similar to Wimsatt’s view of language and with respect to the photograph, 
imagine the process of the photographer. The photographer photographs the fountain in 
the foreground where children are swimming. Their figures are blurred because they are 
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moving and splashing around. An ice cream cart sits in the middle ground whilst rolling 
hills line the background. The photographer composes this image, positioning the 
elements, the fountain, the children, the ice cream cart, the rolling hills, intentionally so 
as to convey to the viewer an experience of human life in the midst of quiet nature. The 
photographer uses techniques, the rule of thirds, and slow shutter speed to compose the 
image so that it is readable. Wimsatt sees the poetic image being composed as 
intentionally and technically as the photographic image. Wimsatt’s poetic image then 
becomes bound within the system of language. The poetic image is framed by Wimsatt’s 
conception of language. Thus, the reader is limited to an experience of nature that lies 
inside a frame, an experience of nature that has been had before. Since Wimsatt’s poetic 
image depends on the view of language as a system, the view of nature is limited not only 
to the system of language but also to the human eye. However, it is no surprise that some 
experiences in nature transcend the senses, stirring other faculties, consciousness, the 
imagination for example; faculties for which there is no system. Is it possible to think that 
language is unable to construct a poetic image of this, what I could call a varied 
experience? With de Man in mind, I resist Wimsatt’s assertions about the system of 
language, and content that language is variable. 
Similarly, Milton’s poem does not stand to construct a landscape according to 
Wimsatt’s theory. In the opening lines of Book I of Paradise Lost, Milton proposes a 
reading of the Fall as variable. That is, instead of the poetic image as a photograph, 
Milton creates a poetic image more akin to a collage. He calls on his muse to write a 
landscape that considers views from various heights. 
Sing Heav’nly Muse, that on the secret top 
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Of Oreb or of Sinai didst inspire 
That shepherd who first taught the chosen seed, 
In the beginning, how the heav’ns and earth 
Rose out of chaos (I; 6-10) 
On the peak of Oreb is where Moses met God and God appeared as a burning bush. From 
this peak, from this view Milton isolates a piece of the landscape to construct his poetic 
image. In the same line Milton isolates a piece of the landscape as viewed from the peak 
of Sinai, a peak higher than Oreb and covered in darkness. Sinai, while part of the same 
mountain range as Oreb no doubt presents a view vastly different from the peak of Oreb. 
Milton requires both of these views to imagine and to represent the rise of heaven out of 
chaos. It is crucial that two views be positioned side by side, in order to testify to the 
variability of an experience and figuring of nature.  
Unlike Wimsatt, Milton uses language not as a universal system but as a mode of 
creating a landscape thick with tension. The two mountain peaks contrast light, the 
burning bush, and dark, tall and taller. Similar to Wimsatt though, the natural world seen 
from the two peaks is one of disorder, of chaos. Instead of using language as a universal 
system of signs to order the chaos, Milton uses language to create an original landscape, a 
landscape in which he may “justify the ways of God to men” (I; 10). 
De Man's theory of the poetic image allows the imagination to enter the text and 
replace a traditional mode of representation. The imagination's view is a constructed 
view— one created similar to an existing view. 
In the same way that Milton uses language to originate a landscape, Paul de Man 
theorizes language as essentially capable of origination in Intentional Structure of the 
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Romantic Image (1970). For this reason language is incapable of direct sensory 
presentation. Origination, says de Man, is the ontological distinction between language, 
the word, and nature, the natural object. De Man states, “For it is in the essence of 
language to be capable of origination, but of never achieving the absolute identity with 
itself that exists in the natural object”(69). If words are capable of origination, then two 
conclusions may follow: one, a word’s beginning or origin is determinable and two, this 
beginning constitutes its existence. Rather than the imagination fusing language with 
sensory perceptions, for de Man the imagination, in its dealings with language, will 
always create a poetic image essentially distinct from nature. 
Similar to Wimsatt, de Man finds nature to be disordered, chaotic insofar as its 
origin cannot be realized: “But the natural object, safe in its immediate being, seems to 
have no beginning and no end. Its permanence is carried by the stability of its being, 
whereas a beginning implies a negation of permanence…”(68). The natural object seems 
to have no beginning and no end because it is conceivable to think of that which came 
before it and that which will spring from it, forever. On the other hand, the word, whose 
origin is determinable, whose beginning constitutes its existence, is impermanent. That is, 
the word, its beginning, what it means, what it stands for, is fleeting, is momentary. 
Milton identifies language as capable of origination. Thus his intent in creating a 
landscape is not to make it ‘readable’ but to make it conceivable. By drawing views from 
multiple heights, he constructs a landscape that is a collage of multiple perspectives. 
The opening lines of Paradise Lost continues, for perhaps the view of Sion hill 
will help to appropriate the landscape Milton is creating in order to justify the ways of 
God to men. Of Sion hill: 
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Or if Sion hill 
Delight thee more and Siloa’s brook that flowed 
Fast by the oracle of God, I thence 
Invoke thy aid to my advent’rous song 
That with no middle flight intends to soar 
Above th’ Aonian mount while it pursues 
Things unattmepted yet in prose or rhyme (I; 12-16). 
The necessity to create a landscape in order to say what has not ever been said is, for 
Milton, an adventure. Through poetry, Milton embarks upon an adventure— an 
exploration— via language of the social state of seventeenth-century England. Using a 
conception of language as capable of origination Milton traverses the landscape of the 
imagination. Milton employs the innovative faculty of the imagination in search of justice 
in the name of God. 
Similar to de Man’s critique of Wimsatt, de Man critiques a view of romanticism 
that prioritizes symbolic diction over allegorical diction. With respect to the relationship 
between language and the subject of language de Man states, “For this dialectic 
originates, it must be remembered, in the assumed predominance of the symbol as the 
outstanding characteristic of romantic diction, and this predominance must, in its turn, be 
put into question” (198). Putting the symbol into question will lead to an alternative 
interpretation of the romantic image, one that is consistent with de Man’s idea of the 
poetic image. With respect to the poetic image, de Man argues that the originating nature 
of the poetic image is characteristic of romantic poetry. This position requires that the 
relationship between experience and representation be examined according to the 
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differences between an experience of nature and a representation of nature. Similarly, de 
Man discusses the relationship between subject and object with respect to its differences. 
This methodology allows him to remain consistent with a view of language as capable of 
origination. The subject’s disparity from language is similar to that of the experience 
from its representation. Through this disparity de Man finds a contradiction in the notion 
of the priority of nature or object (experience) over self or subject (representation). De 
Man states, “They are obliged, on the one hand, to assert the priority of object over 
subject that is implicit in an organic conception of language” (197). The contradiction 
arises because it is not a conception of language as capable of origination that renders this 
hierarchy. Rather a conception of language as containing symbols capable of fusing the 
subject and the object gives weight to the symbol. The object is prioritized over the 
subject, the representation over the experience. However, that is inconsistent with an idea 
of the symbol as a unit of language. De Man’s critique is that this prioritizing of the 
object over the subject in turn prioritizes the symbol over allegory, a hierarchy that is 
arbitrary and inconsistent with its theoretical lineage. 
Thinking about the photograph as a metaphor for Wimsatt’s view of the function 
of language, de Man’s observation of the symbol as a unit of language continues to 
critique a view of language as a unifying system: 
There is the same stress on the analogical unity of nature and consciousness, the 
same priority given to the symbol as the unit of language in which the subject-
object synthesis can take place, the same tendency to transfer in nature attributes 
of consciousness and to unify it organically with respect to a center that acts, for 
natural objects, as the identity of the self functions for a consciousness (200). 
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Thus, de Man’s critique of language viewed according to Wimsatt as well as other 
critics of romanticism leads de Man to investigate the role allegory plays, specifically in 
Rousseau’s novel La Nouvelle Heloise. After careful analysis de Man shows the way in 
which Rousseau’s text actually prioritizes allegorical diction over symbolic diction. His 
argument finds evidence in the fact that the text admits to its ontological status as art and 
not nature: “From the beginning we are told that the natural aspect of the site is in fact the 
result of extreme artifice, that in this bower of bliss, contrary to the tradition of the topos, 
we are entirely in the realm of art and not that of nature”(202). Similarly, in the passage 
above, Milton tells us that the site of his poem is not akin to nature but to imagination by 
calling on his muse. Milton employs an ancient tradition, calling on the muse to tell what 
Milton cannot himself say. Above, I concluded that the poetic image is a product of the 
imagination; similarly it is logical to conclude that the poetic image is also in the realm of 
art. This conclusion is not only consistent with a view of language as capable of 
origination, but it supports the contradiction de Man finds as a result of the prioritization 
of the symbol over allegory. 
The view of language that de Man criticizes is consistent with Lyotard’s critique 
of metalanguage. Lyotard’s critique in Just Gaming (1985) is concerned with a 
distinction between statements of opinion and statements of fact with respect to the 
political. Lyotard clarifies a conception of the political: “Therefore, there is no science of 
the political. I would put it otherwise: There is no metalanguage, and by metalanguage, I 
mean the famous theoretical discourse that is supposed to ground political and ethical 
decisions that will be taken as the basis of its statements” (Lyotard, 28). This critique is 
analogous to de Man’s concern for the distinction between subject and object, nature and 
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the experience of nature. By arguing the prioritization of allegory over symbol, de Man 
concludes that the language of allegory must be capable of origination, intended not to 
represent but to construct a way to  “justify the ways of God to men”. De Man states, 
“The language is purely figural, not based on perception, less still on an experienced 
dialectic between nature and consciousness” (203). Therefore, my hypothesis is that if 
allegory does in fact use "purely figural" language then the effect will be a conflict 
between the work that allegorizes (Paradise Lost) and the work that is allegorized (the 
Bible). 
Paradise Lost explicitly allegorizes the Bible. What constitutes this work as an 
allegory is not that the intent of Milton’s text is similar to the intent of the Bible but that 
it differs. In the final lines of Milton’s text when Adam and Eve are sent out of Eden for 
disobeying God. The Bible intends to justify the ways of God to men by showing Adam 
and Eve’s shame as the punishment for disobeying God. Milton’s text justifies the ways 
of God to men by showing that Adam and Eve’s failure to comply with God’s requests 
sends them to another landscape wherefore to seek out other possible ways of loving 
God. In the final lines of Paradise Lost, Adam and Eve look upon the horizon outside of 
Eden as a plane of possibilities: 
Some natural tears they dropped but wiped them soon. 
The world was all before them, where to choose 
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide. 
They hand in hand with wand’ring steps and slow 
Through Eden took their solitary way (XII; 645-650). 
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According to de Man the allegory stands because there is a conflict between the 
mode the Bible uses to justify the ways of God to men and the mode Milton uses. The 
relationship between God and Man is not based on persistent repentance. Milton views 
the relationship between God and man as a practice of discovering God and a tolerance 
for the various means of knowing God that these discoveries produce. 
The Bible uses nakedness as a symbol for shame; before Adam and Eve ate from 
the Tree of Knowledge they were unashamed. The Bible states, “And they were both 
naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed” (Genesis 2; 25). After their fall their 
nakedness causes them shame: “And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew 
that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons. 
And they heard the voice of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day: 
and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God amongst the 
trees of the garden” (3; 7-8). The Bible employs nakedness as a symbol of the difference 
between a prelapsarian mankind and postlapsarian mankind. This difference is indicated 
by the shame postlapsarian man feels as indicated by his need to cover his nakedness 
from his fellow man and from God. Contrary to the Bible, Milton’s text presents quite a 
different experience of our first parents after eating from the Tree of Knowledge. 
Nakedness is not employed as a symbol in Paradise Lost. Instead it marks the difference 
between the Bible and Paradise Lost. Nakedness as a symbol does not carry over from 
the Bible to Paradise Lost. The effect of this difference is the undermining of the 
authority of the Bible as "truth," and on a less grand scale, the authority of the symbol as 
evidence of language as stable. Milton tells of our Parents’ first experience after eating 
form the Tree of Knowledge: 
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Bad fruit of knowledge if this be to know 
Which leaves us naked thus, of honor void, 
Of innocence, of faith, of purity, 
Our wonted ornaments now soiled and stained 
And in our faces evident the signs 
Of foul concupiscence, whence evil store, 
Ev’n shame the last of evils—of the first 
Be sure then! (IX; 1073-1080) 
Nakedness is a descriptor. Nakedness describes Adam and Eve's original state in nature 
prior to experience. Likewise, nakedness is employed as a descriptor of experience. It is 
self-aware of itself as void of “honor,” “of innocence,” “of faith,” and “of purity” of 
nature. Thus, nature and experience (as represented through language) are distinct from 
one another. An experience of nature—that is a representation of nature through 
language— can never be nature itself. By interpreting nakedness as a description of 
experience, Paradise Lost is inconsistent with the Bible. The difference is between Adam 
and Eve's first experience according to the Bible and according to Paradise Lost. Instead 
of rushing to cover themselves, Paradise Lost recounts quite differently Adam and Eve's 
first experience: 
Nor Eve to iterate 
Her former trespass feared, the more to soothe 
Him with her loved society that now 
As with new wine intoxicated both 
They swim in mirth and fancy that they feel 
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Divinity within them breeding wings 
Wherewith to scorn the earth. But that false fruit 
Far other operation first displayed, 
Carnal desire inflaming (IX; 1005-1013) 
Milton tells that although their sin will “scorn the earth,” their first experience is the 
discovery of each other as worthy of one another: “They swim in mirth and fancy that 
they feel.” Instead of immediate acknowledgment of their disobedience, “Far other 
operation first displayed.” Adam and Eve consummate their partnership as their first 
human experience: 
Her hand he seized and to a shady bank 
Thick overhead with verdant roof embow’red 
He led her nothing loath. Flow’rs were the couch, 
Pansies and violet and asphodel 
And hyacinth, Earth’s freshest softest lap. 
There they their fill of love and love’s disport 
Took largely, of their mutual guilt the seal, 
The solace of their sin (IX; 1037-1044) 
Lovemaking for Adam and Eve is “the solace of their sin.” They lay together on “Earth’s 
freshest softest lap” in the midst of flowers, a scene Milton creates. Subsequent to this 
scene Milton uses “nakedness” to describe a more general postlapsarian conception of 
human experience. These two passages draw attention to the variability of language, 
criticizing what Lyotard calls metalanguage, and what de Man calls the prioritization of 
the symbol. Both Lyotard and de Man criticize this view of language because it 
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necessarily limits an interpretation of allegorical work by prioritizing the symbol. De 
Man states, “For, if the dialectic between subject and object does not designate the main 
romantic experience, but only one passing moment in a dialectic, and a negative moment 
at that, since it represents a temptation that has to be overcome, then the entire historical 
and philosophical pattern changes a great deal” (The Rhetoric of Temporality, 205). 
De Man states that it is a temptation to take language as a stable system and to 
give the Bible authority. However, the defacement of the symbol leads to the authority of 
the allegory. The symbol of nakedness does not carry over into Milton's text. Therefore, 
we must now look to the allegory to analyze the authority of the Bible with respect to 
Paradise Lost. In Paradise Lost the Fall serves to delegitimate the existing system by 
obstructing the authority of the symbol of nakedness.  
The critical approach that de Man provides through a reading of romantic 
literature is consistent with a reading of Milton’s Paradise Lost. It is evident in his 
essays, The Nature of Romantic Nature Imagery, and The Rhetoric of Temporality that a 
conception of language as capable of origination and the priority of allegorical diction 
over symbolic diction is a shared view of Milton’s poetry and Romantic poetry. De 
Man’s essays ask us to reconsider the relationship between experience and nature, 
between subject and object, but most importantly he provides a way of reading ` Lost that 
is radical and theoretically sound. 
V: Conclusion: The Presentation of a Theoretical Entity 
Davis's article distinguishes radicalism as theoretical. Through the example of de 
Man's analysis of Romantic poetry I have shown that Milton employs a theoretically 
sound conception of language and its possibilities. Allegory according to de Man is a 
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form of delegitimation. Identifying differences between Paradise Lost and the Bible 
serves to uproot the illusionary authority of a traditional text. The possibility of a 
theoretical entity existing within a text is a way of reading Paradise Lost. Milton's text 
illustrates views that characterize 17th-century English radicalism but also expresses 
radicalism as a theoretical entity. As a theoretical entity radicalism emerges in the poetic 
image created by Milton in Paradise Lost. It is evidence that radicalism be defined as a 
theoretical entity, because it requires expression through a language that is variable. The 
use of allegory in Paradise Lost shows that radicalism defines itself as a theoretical entity 
distinct from a material entity that depends on the use of metalanguage in the context of a 
metanarrative. That is, radicalism does not draw on a system of language that aims to 
express itself within another governing system. A conception of language as capable of 
origination is why the symbol of nakedness in the Bible does not carry over into Paradise 
Lost. With respect to 17th-century England, radicalism's only concern for the traditional 
system was to extinguish it, and to implement original modes of government. To both 
extinguish the current system of government and simultaneously implement a new 
original system, radicalism took to expressing itself through different forms of 
representation. Issues of censorship in the 17th-century limited the explicitness of 
expression, including the expression of radical ideas. Literature, however, capable of 
employing devices that could make implicit what was not allowed to be explicit, provides 
still a valuable means for a presentation of radicalism. Literature as a means of presenting 
radical ideas also serves for the expression of creation. De Man states that the poetic 
image is in the realm of art —this statement allows us to conclude that art, more 
specifically literature, is a sound political outlet. That the transmission of political ideas 
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does not only dwell in the content of historical documents but also in the realm of art is 
how we should analyze a theoretical entity. More important to radicalism, literature 
serves as the primary means of expression. 
The process of legitimation and delegitimation that Davis identifies as inherent in 
a conception of radicalism finds a landscape in literature. Literature provides for 
radicalism the space to both uproot and implant new views. Paradise Lost is an example 
of a literary landscape in which radical views are created and presented. In the expression 
of radical ideas, Milton's text creates radicalism as a theoretical entity. As a theoretical 
entity, radicalism is capable of proliferating as a significant political element not only 
during 17th-century England but also throughout political discourse. Therefore, in order to 
see Milton's epic as postmodern we must stand at the peak of a theoretical mountain, 
where we will view language as capable of origination. From this height the literary 
landscape will become broader, and the lines that separate one territory from another will 
dissolve. The landscape will be a collage of forms from varying historical and political 
groundings. No longer is the landscape strictly instructive. It is expressive. From this 
viewpoint Paradise Lost views expression as indicative of knowledge, that where there is 
expression there is knowing. Unique to Paradise Lost is the expression of its radical 
political charge.  Paradise Lost serves as a testament that politics as a body of knowledge 
is transferable primarily through expression. Consistent with Lyotard's view of politics, 
Milton's literature presents knowledge of radical politics not by means of a metalanguage 
but through a metadiscourse. In conclusion I would like to propose that Paradise Lost is a  
metadiscourse. As a metadiscourse it is concerned with the discourse of politics. This 
conclusion is a proposition for further study of Milton with respect to postmodern 
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philosophy. As a means of representing radical politics, Paradise Lost contributes to a 
political discourse whose aim was and still is, according to postmodernism, primarily 
concerned with presentation. 
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